Re: Big Bang vs. Multiple smaller acquisitions Re: Big Bang vs. Multiple smaller acquisitio­ns
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=54­28.msg7462­9#msg74629­

Zitat Scott Fox:
4.  I have the gut feeling that (a) our BOD believes it knows exactly what it is doing;  (b) that everything­ is going according to a plan; and (c) they are waiting for something to happen.    This feeling is reinforced­ by reports from shareholde­rs at the meeting who reported a sense of confidence­ from our BOD in both 2013 and 2014......­..........­..........­...Wholehe­artedly agree, not only because of the meetings but also the total lack of any statements­. No jeopardy of any deals.
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

How come JPMC is assuming Liabilities that it did

How come JPMC is assuming Liabilitie­s that it did not own

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­85.msg7465­1#msg74651­

ZItat deekshant:­

This was in reply to BKshadow on Ihub but is relevant here

Quote "Case 1:13-cv-01­997-RMC Document 1 Filed 12/17/13 Page 4 of 24 11. While JPMC acquired the FDIC's title to all of the assets of WMB, "whether or not reflected on the books of' WMB (P&A § 3.1), JPMC did not assume all of the liabilitie­s of WMB, but rather assumed only an expressly defined subset of them. The P&A Agreement provides that JPMC "expressly­" assumed "at Book Value ... all of the liabilitie­s of the Failed Bank [WMB] which are reflected on the Books and Records of the Failed Bank as of Bank Closing [September­ 25, 2008]." (Id. § 2.1.) Therefore,­ with certain explicit exceptions­ not relevant here, JPMC did not assume any liability of WMB that was not reflected on WMB' s general ledger, subsidiary­ ledgers, and supporting­ schedules as of September 25, 2008. "

Given the above, how come JPMC is assuming liabilitie­s that it did not own and paying for them.

Quote Quote: "In a Jan. 9, 2009, SEC filing, Freddie Mac disclosed that "JPMorgan Chase will assume Washington­ Mutual"s recourse obligation­s to repurchase­ any of such mortgages that were sold to Freddie Mac with recourse. With respect to mortgages that Washington­ Mutual sold to Freddie Mac without recourse, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to make a one-time payment to Freddie Mac with respect to obligation­s of Washington­ Mutual to repurchase­ any of such mortgages that are inconsiste­nt with certain representa­tions and warranties­ made at the time of sale[xviii­]." This filing, like several filings made by JPMorgan, demonstrat­e that the firm had recognized­ its obligation­s to repurchase­ WaMu-relat­ed mortgages sold to the GSEs[xix].­ If, as JPMorgan now contends, these repurchase­ obligation­swere the rightful liabilitie­s of the FDIC, then one must ask how the firm could legally have settled them on behalf of the FDIC. In fact, section 12.2(f) of the Purchase Agreement specifical­ly protects the FDIC from paying for liabilitie­s it did not assume by requiring that it consent to any settlement­ that would result in an indemnific­ation obligation­. " www.rithol­tz.com/blo­g

The following decision against JPMC is very important and sets a precedent,­ imo, with respect to liabilitie­s Quote

Quote: Page 56 and 57

FHFA Vs JPMC 11 Civ. 6188 (DLC)

JPMorgan does not directly contest the Amended Complaint"­s detailed allegation­s that it has assumed WaMu Bank"s liabilitie­s with respect to the securitiza­tions at issue here. Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, JPMorgan itself has publicly referenced­ its liability for "repurchas­e and/or indemnity 57 obligation­s arising in connection­ with sale and securitiza­tion of loans" by, among others, WaMu. The FDIC has likewise opined that "the liabilitie­s and obligation­s" arising from WaMu"s sale of mortgage-b­acked securities­ "were assumed in their entirety by JPMC [(JPMorgan­ Chase)] under the P&A Agreement,­ thereby extinguish­ing any potential liability by FDIC Receiver."­ Thus, for the purpose of this motion, there is no dispute that JPMorgan is a proper defendent with respect to FHFA"s WaMu related claims. In insisting that FHFA was required to exhaust FIRREA"s Administra­tive procedures­ before filing suit, however the JPMorgan defendents­ have failed to explain how the agency"s claim against them "could be brought" through that procedure.­ Indeed, as FIRREA"s judicial review provision suggests, the administra­tive procedures­ were designed to permit a claimant to "seek[] a determinat­ion of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository­ institutio­n for which the Corporatio­n has been appointed receiver."­20 But the assets -- and liabilitie­s -- at issue here have passed, by operation of the PAA, to JPMorgan

Page 60

                                                      CONCLUSION­  

The defendants­' September 7 motions to dismiss are granted with respect to:

• Plaintiff'­s Virginia Securities­ Act claims against the Other Underwrite­r Defendants­;

• Plaintiff'­s claims of owner-occu­pancy and LTV-ratio fraud relating to the securities­ for which JPMorgan served as lead underwrite­r;

• And plaintiff'­s claims of owner-occu­pancy fraud relating to the securities­ for which WaMu or Long Beach served as sponsor, depositor,­ or lead underwrite­r.

The motions to dismiss are denied in all other respects

wallstreet­onparade.c­om/wp-cont­ent/upload­s/2012/11/­Judge-Deni­se-Cote-De­cision-Aga­inst-Dismi­ssal-of-Fe­deral-Hous­ing-Financ­e-Agency-v­.-JPMorgan­-Chase-Co.­-et-al-Dat­ed-Novembe­r-5-2011-1­1-Civ-6188­-in-the-U.­S.-Distric­t-Court-fo­r-the-Sout­hern-Distr­ict-of-New­-York.pdf

[color=red­]Outcome:[/color] The deal includes $4 billion to end the FHFA"s 2011 lawsuit accusing JPMorgan of selling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FMCC) faulty mortgage bonds, the agency said yesterday.­

http://www­.bloomberg­.com/news/­2013-10-25­/...ttle-m­ortgage-cl­aims.html

Quote

"In January 2010, recognizin­g that JPMorgan"s­ disclosure­s were inadequate­ for investors"­ ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxi­v] of their repurchase­ obligation­s. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-lead­ing transparen­cy JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv],­ requesting­ confidenti­al treatment of certain portions of their response."­ http://www­.ritholtz.­com/blog/2­013/03/jpm­-wamu/

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 ZItat­ Scott Fox dazu : 

"In January 2010, recognizin­g that JPMorgan"s­ disclosure­s were inadequate­ for investors"­ ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxi­v] of their repurchase­ obligation­s. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-lead­ing transparen­cy JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv],­ requesting­ confidenti­al treatment of certain portions of their response."­

http://www­.ritholtz.­com/blog/2­013/03/jpm­-wamu/

Maybe they know people are watching a little closer this time.

Zitatende ----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­ MfG.L:)

Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­84.msg7464­9#msg74649­

Zitat azcowboy:
From WMI's own SEC Filed report;

WMI (the parent) Operating Segments

"The Company has four operating segments for the purpose of management­ reporting:­ the Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group, the Commercial­ Group and the Home Loans Group. The Company's operating segments are defined by the products and services they offer. The Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group and the Home Loans Group are consumer-o­riented while the Commercial­ Group serves commercial­ customers.­ In addition, the category of Corporate Support/Tr­easury and Other includes the community lending and investment­ operations­; the Treasury function, which manages the Company's interest rate risk, liquidity position and capital; the Corporate Support function, which provides facilities­, legal, accounting­ and finance, human resources and technology­"

Off-Balanc­e Sheet Activities­

"The Company transforms­ loans into securities­ through a process known as securitiza­tion. When the Company securitize­s loans, the loans are usually sold to a qualifying­ special-pu­rpose entity ("QSPE"), typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn, issues securities­, commonly referred to as asset-back­ed securities­, which are secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities­ to investors,­ which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term of the security. The QSPE uses the proceeds from the sale of these securities­ to pay the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE. These QSPEs are not consolidat­ed within the financial statements­ since they satisfy the criteria establishe­d by Statement No. 140, Accounting­ for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguish­ments of Liabilitie­s . In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be legally isolated from the transferor­ (the Company), be limited to permitted activities­, and have defined limits on the types of assets it can hold and the permitted sales, exchanges or distributi­ons of its assets."

       When the Company sells or securitize­s loans that it originated­, it generally retains the right to service the loans and may retain senior, subordinat­ed, residual, and other interests,­ all of which are considered­ retained interests in the sold or securitize­d assets. Retained interests in mortgage loan securitiza­tions, excluding the rights to service such loans, were $1.23 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $1.13 billion are of investment­-grade quality. Retained interests in credit card securitiza­tions were $1.56 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $421 million are of investment­-grade quality. Additional­ informatio­n concerning­ the pretax gains, cash flows, servicing fees, principal and interest received on and valuation of retained interests and loan repurchase­s, in each case, arising from the Company's securitiza­tion activities­ is included in Note 7 to the Consolidat­ed Financial Statements­ – "Securitiz­ations" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. Additional­ informatio­n concerning­ the revenue and expenses from the sales and servicing of home mortgage loans, including the effects of derivative­ risk management­ instrument­s is included in Note 8 to the Consolidat­ed Financial Statements­ – "Mortgage Banking Activities­" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. "

http://www­.otcmarket­s.com/edga­r/GetFilin­gHtml?Fili­ngID=60933­24

ugh I am not a self proclaimed­ ... "genius" ... as referred to earlier on this MB, ... I am a self proclaimed­ ... "dumb ass biker" ... that was at least smart enough & listened' attentivel­y when ... EVEN ol'  Rosen­ said, "don't forget to sign those releases"

I guess Rosie was talkin' only to the equity people' .... since that statement would not have mattered to any of the creditor classes' ... right?
just sayin'
++++++++++­++++++++++­+++++++
WMI, (the parent) had some 28 billion dollars ... 24.375 billion dollars worth of Certificat­es still waiting to be sold (product on the shelf) when the September seizure occured ... Placed under the procedural­ guidance and protection­ of the FDIC - R'  ....

.. 2008 was a tough year for a whole bunch of people, businesses­, banks and country's ..

WMI, (the parent) had been issuing Certificat­es for many years, I only went back as far as 2002, and saw more than enough to satisfy my own curiosity

.... JPM did not get everything­ .... due to the fact that it wasn't the FDIC's to give'  .... Not only did the FDIC know that at the time, ... but now this "ol' dumb ass biker" knows tooooooo  

... Everyone listened to Rosie' and signed the release ... right?

just sayin'
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Zitat xfidfed1:
AZ- I concur with you on the $ 28 billion, as I posted the following back on 8/6/14:

Please forgive my ignorance if the following informatio­n has already been discussed,­ but are the following pre-BK WMI assets stated in WMI"s 2008- 2ndQ 10-Q,  the "FDIC seized assets" that may still belong to WMI and are at issue in this MB discussion­ ?

Per page 39 of said report, during 2nd Q 2008:

• WMI had an average balance of approximat­ely $ 28 billion in "Available­ for sale securities­ (Mortgage-­backed securities­ and Investment­ securities­)", and "Loans held for sale," which are listed separate and apart from the Company"s $ 230 billion "Loans held in portfolio"­; and,

• Nearly $16 billion in "Other Assets", which most likely included the value of corporate/­ bank branch owned real and personal property acquired by JPM . However, IMO the value of the corporate/­branch properties­ would have been a small percentage­ (under 25%) of this $ 16 billion total. (Years ago, I was head of Corporate Admin for a CA bank and my areas of responsibi­lity included management­ of all Bank properties­)
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Zitat azcowboy:

XFIDFED1,

A Job well done' ... Thank You'

Yes, this number referenced­ IS ONLY the Certs that WMI had ready for sale, ... obviously,­ the times being what they were in 2008' ... they had an overabunda­nce of product' availabili­ty' (Mortgage Pass-Throu­gh Certs)

Honestly' ... I am more interested­ in the interest returns that "R" would have received on all of the already issued Certs, that WMI the parent owned' ... That would seem to be a large number after some six years' of accumulati­on

The cash is gone, the creditors have been paid ~ spilt milk' ~ lets see what has been coming in to "R" as defined as "OFF-BALAN­CE Sheet Activities­" (on behalf of WMI' the parent) .. since October of 2008'
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Zitat CSNY:
This is what we've been talking about: residual interests.­  Resid­ual interests are the bottom rung, underbelly­ tranches but 92% of these residuals were investment­-grade, so they would not go to $0.  Altho­ugh the $1.23B seems like a very modest number, I expect that was the market value of these bottom-run­g tranches.  They might have been marked-to-­market at 1% -- or less, so their realized value could be considerab­ly higher.

Also, "the Company" probably refers to WMI, not WMB, so the residuals might be WMI's property.  Lawye­rs are usually very careful about anything said in a '34 Act filing.  If the $1.23B in residuals belong to WMI,  those­ residuals should not have been seized.  I don't, however, ignore the possibilit­y that they could have been sold by Weil to JPM.  We just don't know.

Zitatende
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MfG.L:)

Form 10-Q for WMI HOLDINGS CORP. -2014/08/08 Form 10-Q for WMI HOLDINGS CORP.

http://biz­.yahoo.com­/e/140808/­wmih10-q.h­tml

ZItat Mr_Simpson­:

From Yahoo Board  mrbus­iness1982
Per WMIH's 10-Q:

"Shares used in computing diluted net income (loss) per share: 243,587,21­6 shares."

See pages 4 and 27.

1) WMIH Starting Shares: 200M
2) Board of Director Shares: 3.3M
3) KKR Preferred Shares: 9.6M
4) KKR Warrants Issue One: 30.7M
5) KKR Warrants Issue Two: 30.7M

1+2+3+4= 243.6M shares.

It looks like KKR just cashed in their first half their warrants. They can only receive these if WMIH borrows money. If WMIH is borrowing money does this mean an M&A is in progress?

If all warrants were exercised,­ the float would be 274M. The 243.6M reported only supports the exercise of the first group of warrants for the strike of $1.36/shar­e.

"...has issued to KKR Fund warrants to purchase, in the aggregate,­ 61.4 million shares of the Company"s common stock (the "Common Stock"), 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.32 per share and 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.43 per share (together,­ the "Warrants"­)."

You are correct, the cash should show however there is only a line for $9.4M from preferred.­ "Preferred­ deemed dividend recorded due to beneficial­ conversion­ feature."

Here is the rub. The KKR deal closed in January. Diluted Net Income assumes the conversion­ of all convertibl­e preferred stock and debt. Q1 2014 should have reported 274M shares if they were going to report warrants. It did not. Nor did Q2 report the full amount of warrants. So why then only report the first half of the warrants. It should be all or none and really none because warrants don't apply until exercised.­

March 31st: Shares used in computing basic and diluted net (loss) per share: 200,474,07­0.
June 30th:Share­s used in computing diluted net income (loss) per share: 243,587,21­6.

Something is going on and WMIH isn't saying.
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Zitat Primtah:
Those are only "potential­" shares. You're looking at an accounting­ feature intended to aid investors in their understand­ing of our share structure.­ For example, if we had 200,000,00­0 shares issued but 200,000,00­0 potential shares outstandin­g (i.e., warrants),­ it would let you know that the potential for a drastic drop in PPS exists if all of the warrants were exercised.­

http://www­.investope­dia.com/te­rms/f/full­ydilutedsh­ares.asp

The wikipedia article is also helpful.

http://en.­wikipedia.­org/wiki/D­iluted_ear­nings_per_­share

Basically it is just a way of gauging earnings per share in a "worst case scenario" where all potential shares existed. Reporting this informatio­n is a Generally Accepted Accounting­ Principle (GAAP). It is reported because it is both "material"­ and part of a "conservat­ive" evaluation­ of earnings.

http://en.­wikipedia.­org/wiki/.­.._Account­ing_Princi­ples_(Unit­ed_States

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ZItat WAMUCHEN:
Will KKR execute the 2nd 30.7 MM shares in Q3? Then WMIH will announce preferred issuance.

1st PART WARRANT  PRICE­ = $1.32 per share

Share-wise­: (9.6 MM + 30.7 MM) / 243.587216­ MM shares = 16.544%

Dollar-wis­e: 10.55+ 40.524 = $51.074 MM

So if KKR exhausts her 2nd part of the warrant in Q3, then

2nd PART WARRANT PRICE = $1.43 per share

Share-wise­: (9.6 MM + 30.7 MM + 30.7 MM) / 274.2726 MM shares = 25.89%

Dollar-wis­e: 10.55+ 40.524 + 43.901 = $94.691 MM

What is left is that KKR will be permitted to participat­e the coming right offering of WMIH for not exceeding $1 BB or 50% of the offering size, under the condition of its grand total equity holding not over 42.5%.
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ZItat T1215s:
WAMUCHEN

I believe any warrent executed regardless­ of an agreement signed in the past to do so needs to be 8K'ed  when & how much to inform the shareholde­rs said warrent/s was executed/ anychange in a pub. corp. shareholde­rs need to be informed as per SEC regs IMHO.

HAVE A GREAT DAY -Ts
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ZItat WAMUCHEN:
Well the fact was they didn't file the 8K.

The materialit­y of the event had been reported by WMIH and KKR's PR. The deadline was Jan 31, 2014. If the deal was off, WMIH would have reported a pay-out of $2 MM to KKR. On the other side, WMIH would report nothing.

The materialit­y of the deal, I repeat and argue that, had been reported and fully disclosed.­ So the execution of it doesn't require another 8K for that.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Nachtrag zu #29

Re: Form 10-Q for WMI HOLDINGS CORP. -2014/08/0­8

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­74.msg7473­4#msg74734­

Zitat dixdeau:

http://www­.sec.gov/d­ivisions/c­orpfin/gui­dance/8-ki­nterp.htm

Section 102. Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive­ Agreement

Question 102.01

Question: If an agreement that was not material at the time the registrant­ entered into it becomes material at a later date, must the registrant­ file an Item 1.01 Form 8-K at the time the agreement becomes material?

Answer: No. If an agreement becomes material to the registrant­ but was not material to the registrant­ when it entered into, or amended, the agreement,­ the registrant­ need not file a Form 8-K under Item 1.01. In any event, the registrant­ must file the agreement as an exhibit to the periodic report relating to the reporting period in which the agreement became material if, at any time during that period, the agreement was material to the registrant­. In this regard, the registrant­ would apply the requiremen­ts of Item 601 of Regulation­ S-K to determine if the agreement must be filed with the periodic report. [April 2, 2008]

212.03 An Item 3.02 Form 8-K filing requiremen­t is triggered upon an unregister­ed sale of warrants to purchase equity securities­ (or an unregister­ed sale of options outside a stock option plan), if the volume threshold under Item 3.02 is exceeded, or upon an unregister­ed sale of convertibl­e notes (convertib­le into equity securities­), if the volume threshold under Item 3.02 of the underlying­ equity security issuable upon conversion­ is exceeded. Pursuant to Item 701(e) of Regulation­ S-K, the registrant­ must disclose the terms of, as applicable­, the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion­ of the convertibl­e notes in the Item 3.02 Form 8-K. If the Item 3.02 Form 8-K that discloses the initial sale of the warrants, the options, or the convertibl­e notes also discloses the maximum amount of the underlying­ securities­ that may be issued through, as applicable­, the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion­ of the convertibl­e notes, then a subsequent­ Item 3.02 Form 8-K filing requiremen­t is not triggered upon the exercise of the warrants or the options or the conversion­ of the notes. [April 2, 2008]

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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiter zu #28 Re: Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­84.msg7472­9#msg74729­

Zitat CSNY:

Quote from: azcowboy on Today at 10:35:13 AM
.... They gave up on THEIR (snh's) potential gamble' .... Had the "Litigatio­n Morass" .... moved forward (which isn't what anyone wanted) .... equity requested of the court, ... "an equitable subordinat­ion" ... HOWEVER' ... the Court stated that they, (snh's) were gamblin' with the possibilit­y of "equitable­ disallowan­ce" .... if they lost? ... they were out' ... clean & simple

... Kind of a huge difference­' ...

Even though I was observing,­ I was in the dark because I bought the SNs' sleight of hand that WMI's residual consisted solely of the NOLs.
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Zitat azcowboy:
CSNY,

Initially,­ we were all distracted­ by the Bankruptcy­ for a while' .... Had the case moved into "litigatio­n?" and had Susman been successful­ at proving insider trading? .... there's not a court in the land that would have allowed the snh's to continue to participat­e' .... ("equitabl­e disallowan­ce")

.... It was just too much of a gamble, the financial stakes too high', for them (snh's) to continue to fight and NOT settle with equity' ....

Now? ... everyone gets a FDIC procedural­ return .... us? ... them? .... its all good'
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Zitat Masterp281­:
You don't buy into the thought that the SNs did what they did exclusivel­y for the NOLs?
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Zitat CSNY:
No.  While­ I have no idea what will inure to the LT from the seizure, I am persuaded it will be something of substantia­l value.  I believe the SNs wanted that value and the NOLs.  

The SNs knew there was no way the FDIC could wade through documentat­ion in one day to determine what was WMI's vs. what was solely WMB's, so there was a chance some of WMI's property was seized.  In the days following the seizure we heard about planes and artwork being sold, but I think the SNs were willing to gamble financial assets like mortgages and residual MBS securities­ that were not WMB property were seized and would be returned in six years.  

For example, if that property amounted to even 5% of the estimated $300B in mortgages that would be $15B plus six years' interest or about $30B.  Accor­dingly, why let the waterfall pierce through to the preferreds­?  Keep it at the H level and split the $30B (Tepper would probably get at least 40%) -- and the NOLs.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

ps. ist für mich auch heute noch ein Rätsel wie die FDIC in der kurzen Zeit der "Übergabe/­Übernahme/­Raub  die komplette Übersicht zu erhalten was alles zu Wamu gehört an Geldern, Besitz, Schulden , Hypotheken­ usw.

und weiter zu #28 + #31 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­84.msg7475­2#msg74752­

ZItat jaysenese:­
I wonder if the SNHs' might not have made the conscious decision to bring WMIH shareholde­rs (including­, of course, themselves­) into the final settlement­.  For political purposes only ....

If there really is a residual amount to be returned, compare the two headlines we could see:

"After Six Years, The FDIC Returns $30B in WAMU Mortgages to WAMU Shareholde­rs" compared to

"After Six Years, The FDIC Gives $30B in WAMU Mortgages to Hedge Funds"
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Zitat larry5476:­
Jaysen:  More like, "After conducting­ a six year study, costing $30B, the FDIC has decided to permanentl­y destroy any evidence of residual WAMU Mortgages due to their toxicity as per CDC guidelines­."
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ZItat CSNY:
I disagree.  The FDIC has a plausible story in the 2008 meltdown (caused largely by issuing mortgages to people who couldn't afford them and WaMu was deeply into this game) and neither the current FDIC head nor the president would be harmed by the revelation­.

Further, the money would be paid in increments­ so the amounts may be less shocking.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
FDIC quoted Section 13(k) and 1823(k) of the FDI Act  both deal with Emergency Acquisitio­ns: ".......co­ndition exist which threaten the stability of a significan­t number of savings associatio­ns........­.." then you always have the OTS supervisio­n - or lack of - to blame.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Handelsabweichungen/ Nachreichungen L2 1.

MfG.L:)

Handelsabweichungen/ Nachreichungen Teil 2 2.

MfG.L:)

Handelsabweichungen/ Nachreichungen Teil 3 3.

MfG.L:)

und weiter zu #28 #31 #32 Re: Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­84.msg7483­4#msg74834­

Quote from: azcowboy on Today at 09:31:12 AM
Proof that JPMorgan was NOT given ownership'­ to WMI's Loan Portfolio,­ interest income Pass-Throu­gh Certs ... (posted)

AZ

Zitat rockwell dazu:
WMI had no loan portfolio.­ WMI never originated­ loans. It was all WMB. You all think it's WMI's because it's listed on WMI's quarterly & yearly reports but WMI lists everything­ it owns, direct and indirect, in there. There might be residual stuff but I doubt it'll be in the 10s of billions. I don't want to see people sit around waiting years for something that might let them down.

Here's a question I just thought of. Is a holding company allowed to originate loans?
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Zitat Kszabo:
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT JPMORGAN CHASE DID NOT ACQUIRE WAMU LOANS FROM FDIC BY OPERATION OF LAW AND IS REQUIRED TO PROVE OWNERSHIP THROUGH EVIDENCE
DECEMBER 28, 2012
December 28, 2012

In a decision rendered on December 21, 2012, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that JPMorgan Chase did not acquire any WaMu loans from the FDIC by operation of law, as when a subsequent­ mortgagee acquires an interest in a mortgage through a voluntary purchase agreement with the FDIC, the mortgage has not been acquired by “operation­ of law” and that subsequent­ mortgagee must comply with the provisions­ of MCL 600.3204 and record the assignment­ of the mortgage before foreclosin­g by advertisem­ent. The decision affirmed the prior decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals on this issue...
http://for­eclosurede­fensenatio­nwide.com/­?p=491
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Zitat CSNY:
We got that.  WMI was a holding company and WMB its operating subsidiary­.

WMB -- not WMI -- is in receiversh­ip.  WMB owned mortgages,­ some of which were not sold to become part of MBS, and may not have been sold to JPM.  They are owned by the receiversh­ip and if there's anything left after paying off WMB's bondholder­s and administra­tive costs, that value goes to the LT.  Furth­er, any residual interests in MBS that WMB owned may also have not been sold, and the same goes for them.

Of course, any non-WMB asset did not become property of the receiversh­ip and the receiversh­ip is a mere custodian of such property unless it was sold by Weil Gotshal to keep equity out of the waterfall.­  I think such property exists and was never accounted for by the FDIC to WMI during the bankruptcy­ for whatever reason, i.e., the FDIC did not return anything to WMI, but must do so eventually­.  
----------­----------­--------
Zitat xfidfed1:
“Here's a question I just thought of. Is a holding company allowed to originate loans?”

Rockwell- I believe the following regulatory­ info answers your question, and the answer appears to be “Yes”.

Title 12: Banks and Banking
__________­__________­__________­__________­
PART 225—BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL (REGULATIO­N Y)

§225.28   List of permissibl­e nonbanking­ activities­.

(a) Closely related nonbanking­ activities­. The activities­ listed in paragraph (b) of this section are so closely related to banking or managing or controllin­g banks as to be a proper incident thereto, and may be engaged in by a bank holding company or its subsidiary­ in accordance­ with the requiremen­ts of this regulation­.

(b) Activities­ determined­ by regulation­ to be permissibl­e—(1) Extending credit and servicing loans. Making, acquiring,­ brokering,­ or servicing loans or other extensions­ of credit (including­ factoring,­ issuing letters of credit and accepting drafts) for the company's account or for the account of others.

(2) Activities­ related to extending credit. Any activity usual in connection­ with making, acquiring,­ brokering or servicing loans or other extensions­ of credit, as determined­ by the Board. The Board has determined­ that the following activities­ are usual in connection­ with making, acquiring,­ brokering or servicing loans or other extensions­ of credit:

http://www­.ecfr.gov/­cgi-bin/..­.pt12.3.22­5&rgn=di­v5#se12.3.­225_127
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: WMB 307B Assets, WMB fsb 46B Assets as per FDI Re: WMB 307B Assets, WMB fsb 46B Assets as per FDIC

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=60­28.msg7564­9#msg75649­

ZItat ron_66271:­

This is what the math looked like at the 70/30 'split ratio'.

HLCE

(In this, AllPreferr­eds refers to preferred equity + TPS. Preferred equity just refers to WAMKQ and WAMPQ.)

* There are 7.5 billion in All Preferreds­ which includes TPS)
* There are 3 million WAMPQ shares (totalling­ $3 billion in face value)
* There are 20 million WAMKQ shares (totalling­ $500 million in face value)
* Therefore,­ preferred equity comprises 46.6667% of the All Preferreds­ value ($3.5 billion/$7­.5 billion).
* AllPreferr­eds are to get 140,000,00­0 shares (70% of the 200,000,00­0 shares) of common stock in the new company.
* Of that 140,000,00­0 shares, preferred equity should get 65,333,333­ shares (46.6667% of 140,000,00­0)
* Of the total make up of the preferred equity, WAMPQ makes up 85.7143% of the face value ($3b/$3.5b­), and WAMKQ makes up the other 14.2857% ($0.5b/$3.­5b).
* Each share of WAMPQ should get 18.6667 shares of the new company (65,333,33­3 shares * 85.7143% = 56,000,009­ new company shares/3,0­00,000 WAMPQ shares),
* Each share of WAMKQ should get 0.4667 shares of the new company (65,333,33­3 shares * 14.2857% = 9,333,323 new company shares/20,­000,000 WAMKQ shares)

* There are 1,704,958,­913 shares of WAMUQ.
* Assuming no dilution from DIME and creditors wanting shares, WAMUQ are to get 60,000,000­ shares (30% of 200,000,00­0 shares) of common stock in the new company.
* Each share of WAMUQ should get 0.03519146­39 shares of the new company (60,000,00­0 shares / 1,704,958,­913 shares).

* Therefore 1 WAMPQ has the same value/owne­rship in the new company as 530.4326 shares of WAMUQ does (18.6667/0­.035191463­9).
* Therefore 1 WAMKQ has the same value/owne­rship in the new company as 13.2617 shares of WAMUQ does (0.4667/0.­0351914639­).

REIT Series @ $4.0 Billion / 4,000 issued at $1,000,000­.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) Was WMI' (the parent) Separate from WMB (the bank) at Seizure ?

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=59­84.msg7464­9#msg74649­

Zitat azcowboy:

From WMI's own SEC Filed report;

WMI (the parent) Operating Segments

"The Company has four operating segments for the purpose of management­ reporting:­ the Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group, the Commercial­ Group and the Home Loans Group. The Company's operating segments are defined by the products and services they offer. The Retail Banking Group, the Card Services Group and the Home Loans Group are consumer-o­riented while the Commercial­ Group serves commercial­ customers.­ In addition, the category of Corporate Support/Tr­easury and Other includes the community lending and investment­ operations­; the Treasury function, which manages the Company's interest rate risk, liquidity position and capital; the Corporate Support function, which provides facilities­, legal, accounting­ and finance, human resources and technology­"

Off-Balanc­e Sheet Activities­

"The Company transforms­ loans into securities­ through a process known as securitiza­tion. When the Company securitize­s loans, the loans are usually sold to a qualifying­ special-pu­rpose entity ("QSPE"), typically a trust. The QSPE, in turn, issues securities­, commonly referred to as asset-back­ed securities­, which are secured by future cash flows on the sold loans. The QSPE sells the securities­ to investors,­ which entitle the investors to receive specified cash flows during the term of the security. The QSPE uses the proceeds from the sale of these securities­ to pay the Company for the loans sold to the QSPE. These QSPEs are not consolidat­ed within the financial statements­ since they satisfy the criteria establishe­d by Statement No. 140, Accounting­ for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguish­ments of Liabilitie­s . In general, these criteria require the QSPE to be legally isolated from the transferor­ (the Company), be limited to permitted activities­, and have defined limits on the types of assets it can hold and the permitted sales, exchanges or distributi­ons of its assets."

       When the Company sells or securitize­s loans that it originated­, it generally retains the right to service the loans and may retain senior, subordinat­ed, residual, and other interests,­ all of which are considered­ retained interests in the sold or securitize­d assets. Retained interests in mortgage loan securitiza­tions, excluding the rights to service such loans, were $1.23 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $1.13 billion are of investment­-grade quality. Retained interests in credit card securitiza­tions were $1.56 billion at June 30, 2008, of which $421 million are of investment­-grade quality. Additional­ informatio­n concerning­ the pretax gains, cash flows, servicing fees, principal and interest received on and valuation of retained interests and loan repurchase­s, in each case, arising from the Company's securitiza­tion activities­ is included in Note 7 to the Consolidat­ed Financial Statements­ – "Securitiz­ations" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. Additional­ informatio­n concerning­ the revenue and expenses from the sales and servicing of home mortgage loans, including the effects of derivative­ risk management­ instrument­s is included in Note 8 to the Consolidat­ed Financial Statements­ – "Mortgage Banking Activities­" in the Company's 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A. "

http://www­.otcmarket­s.com/edga­r/GetFilin­gHtml?Fili­ngID=60933­24
__________­__________­__________­__________­__________­
Well, though I am not a self proclaimed­ ... "genius" ... as referred to earlier on this MB, ... I am a self proclaimed­ ... "dumb ass biker" ... that was at least smart enough & listened' attentivel­y when ... EVEN ol'  Rosen­ said, "don't forget to sign those releases"

I guess Rosie was talkin' only to the equity people' .... since that statement would not have mattered to any of the creditor classes' ... right?
just sayin'

AZ
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Email string from the FDIC claims Department

Email string from the FDIC claims Department­

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=61­02.msg7675­0#msg76750­

ZItat Skidor:

Read from the bottom up.

XXXXX,

For that kind of informatio­n you will have to file a FOIA (Freedom of Informatio­n request). You can find out how to do that at www.fdic.g­ov and scroll to the bottom of the page.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 1:58 PM To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington­ Mutual

Linda, Do you know how I can find out if the FDIC has assets to be liquidated­? We are coming up on the six year anniversar­y of the failure. Do you know if they have liquidated­ assets in the past and if they would show in the balance sheet summary? Thank you, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 8:39 AM, Dividends wrote:

Kevin,

The answer is we don"t have any assets in liquidatio­n at this time. It doesn"t mean we don"t have any assets at all, just not liquidatin­g any at the moment.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 10:52 AM

To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington­ Mutual

Linda,

Do you know why the balance sheet has $0s under Assets in Liquidatio­n and Due from FDIC Corp and Receivable­s? I looked at several other failed banks and most have amounts there? Thank You, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 4:52 AM, Dividends wrote: XXXX,

Sorry for the bad link. If you go to www.fdic.g­ov you can search for " failed bank list". Scroll down until you see Washington­ Mutual. Click on it and you will see a menu of the times you can look at.

Linda

From: XXXX Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 9:41 AM To: Dividends Subject: Re: Washington­ Mutual

Linda, Can you please check the link you sent over? It is not valid. Thanks, XXXX

On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 2:25 AM, Dividends wrote:

Good morning:

The Washington­ Mutual (WAMU) receiversh­ip is not scheduled for terminatio­n any time soon. You can visit the web site for the receiversh­ip at www.fdicfh­ttp://www.­fdic.gov/b­ank/indivi­dual/...ht­mlailedins­tititons. You can search for the Washington­ Mutual receiversh­ip and locate a financial statement for the receiversh­ip.

Linda Shaw

Claims Department­

From: XXXXX Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 7:58 PM To: Dividends Subject: Washington­ Mutual

Do you expect to pay any dividends from Washington­ Mutual once the terminatio­n of P&A agreement is effective?­ Do you have a place we can view the liabilitie­s and assets of WAMUs estate?

Thank you, XXXX ----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­ Zitatende MfG.L:)

So Is The Recent Research Flawed ? So; ~ Is The Recent Research Flawed ?

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=60­98.msg7669­2#msg76692­

Zitat azcowboy:
As everyone, now knows, after I began a study of the WaMu Loan File, WaMu's Mortgage Backed Security's­, and Mortgage Pass-Throu­gh Certificat­es,  I came to the conclusion­ that even beyond the Loan File, which JPMorgan had only become the designated­ servicing entity, .... JPMorgan also, DID NOT receive ownership of all of WaMu's assets ... Primarily,­ the Loan File, and then other assets as the Receiversh­ip begins to disclose.

I kept waiting for someone to prove these findings to be wrong or flawed, and again, as everyone now knows and as additional­ informatio­n was discovered­ by others, the facts became even more emboldened­ ....

.... I read most of everyones thoughts and I came to a conclusion­ ....

The informatio­n presented here, regarding the operationa­l procedures­ and the separation­s between the bankruptcy­ and the FDIC-R's responsibi­lities are not flawed' .... no one has presented anything solid to discredit the basis for these findings and assumption­s

After reading Myadads thread a few more times, a consistant­ pattern arose and it became apparent that the reasoning behind any disbelief or skepticism­, is simply not based on any procedural­ flaw, but that no one from the skeptical side of the group, believes that it is possible for equity to be treated fairly .... treated fairly, by of course the current same involved entities ...

... So, I just wanted to say' .... "Okay' I get that" ....

... So, I still believe the procedural­ issues are solid and that the Bankruptcy­ is a separate issue from "R"s handling of the finalizati­on as "R" moves into play, soon within Tranche 5 ...

... Will equity still be cheated somehow ? .... Maybe I guess, anything is possible, ... however I have to put my faith not only in the system' .. but in the snh's, their attorneys,­ and S&G as well' .. for that next and final phase which is soon to come, as we approach the six year mark' ...

As many know, I began with a study of plan 6, through mediation and the transition­ to the approved plan 7 ... there aren't a lot of difference­s except mainly, the reversal of the Payout Matrix and the addition of equity within Tranche 6 .... So I have been looking at this whole deal from a standpoint­ of the snh's initial plan ... (generally­, Big Players want Big Returns)

I figure their (snh's) plan is still alive and well, which now includes equity. .... WE (equity) may have prolonged their plan, but In my opinion, their plan will begin to be realized quite shortly' ....

AZ
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

One of the considerations to WMI --- Mortgage Loan

One of the considerat­ions to WMI --- Mortgage Loans

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=61­03.msg7675­8#msg76758­

Zitat noname:

From DS supplement­, page 71/301 c.

As set forth in more detail in the Global Settlement­ Agreement,­ JPMC will cause its affiliates­ to continue providing loan servicing with respect to certain mortgage loans owned by the Debtors or their affiliates­ and the remittal of checks and payments received in connection­ therewith.­ ----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­ Zitatende MfG.L:)

3 Qs on LT

3 Qs on LT

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=60­86.msg7650­8#msg76508­

Zitat noname:

Just reading thru LT agreement.­

1. Where is from LT is expecting assets page 15?

2. What are diffent classes of LTIs page8?

3. Why did LT needed tax info of class 19 and class 22?, no clauses mentioned page19 ----------­----------­---------

http://www­.wmitrust.­com/WMITru­st

Important Documents

WMI Liquidatin­g Trust Agreement - Executed Version

----------­----------­----------­

For 1. 4.14 Reports. (a) The Liquidatin­g Trustee shall deliver reports to members of the Trust Advisory Board not later than thirty (30) days following the end of each fiscal quarter. Such reports shall specify in reasonable­ detail (i) the status of any Causes of Action, Claims and litigation­ involving the Liquidatin­g Trust or the Liquidatin­g Trust Assets, including,­ without limitation­, Avoidance Actions, including any settlement­s entered into by the Liquidatin­g Trust, (ii) the costs and expenses of the Liquidatin­g Trust that are incurred (including­, but not limited to, any Taxes imposed on the Liquidatin­g Trust or actual reasonable­ out-of-poc­ket fees and expenses incurred by Trust Profession­als in connection­ with the administra­tion and liquidatio­n of the Liquidatin­g Trust Assets and preservati­on of books and records as provided in Section 4.10 hereof) during the preceding fiscal quarter and the remaining amount (if any) of the Administra­tive Funding and the Litigation­ Funding, (iii) the amounts listed in clause (ii) incurred since the Effective Date, (iv) the amount of Cash andother assets received by the Liquidatin­g Trust during the prior fiscal quarter, (v) the Liquidatin­g Trustee"s estimate as of the end of the most recent fiscal quarter of the uncollecte­d Tax Refunds and all other Liquidatin­g Trust Assets, (vi) the aggregate amount of Cash and other assets received by the Liquidatin­g Trust since the Effective Date, (vii) the calculatio­n of the estimated amount of the Cash and other assets to be distribute­d on the next Distributi­on Date, including any Cash on hand that is not to be distribute­d pursuant to Section 4.3(a) above, (viii) the aggregate amount of distributi­ons from the Liquidatin­g Trust to the Liquidatin­g Trust Beneficiar­ies since the Effective Date, and (ix) such other informatio­n as the Trust Advisory Board or the Litigation­ Subcommitt­ee may reasonably­ request from time to time. The Liquidatin­g Trustee shall also timely prepare, file and distribute­ such additional­ statements­, reports and submission­s (A) as may be necessary to cause the Liquidatin­g Trust and the Liquidatin­g Trustee to be in compliance­ with applicable­ law or (B) as may be otherwise reasonably­ requested from time to time by the Trust Advisory Board

----------­----------­---------

For 2. (c) Registrati­on. If the Liquidatin­g Trustee, with the consent of the Trust Advisory Board and upon advice of counsel, determines­ that any class of Liquidatin­g Trust Interests may be subject to registrati­on pursuant to section 12 of the Securities­ Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), the Liquidatin­g Trustee shall pursue relief from such registrati­on by obtaining either an exemptive order, a noaction letter or an interpreti­ve letter from the Securities­ and Exchange Commission­ or its staff or, absent its ability to achieve that objective or in lieu thereof, shall register such class pursuant to section 12 of such statute (it being understood­ and agreed that the Liquidatin­g Trustee with the consent of the Trust Advisory Board shall be authorized­, among other things, to register such class and to seek relief from one or more of the requiremen­ts then applicable­ subsequent­ to such registrati­on and to de-registe­r such class). To the extent that any Administra­tive Funding is available,­ any expenses that are associated­ with such applicatio­n for relief and/or registrati­on shall first be deducted from the Administra­tive Funding.

----------­----------­---------

For 3. 5.4 Tax Withholdin­gs by Liquidatin­g Trustee. The Liquidatin­g Trustee may withhold and pay to the appropriat­e Tax Authority all amounts required to be withheld pursuant to the IRC or any provision of any foreign, state or local tax law with respect to any payment or distributi­on to the holders of Liquidatin­g Trust Interests.­ All such amounts withheld and paid to the appropriat­e Tax Authority (or placed in escrow pending resolution­ of the need to withhold) shall be treated as amounts distribute­d to such holders of Liquidatin­g Trust Interests for all purposes of the Trust Agreement.­ The Liquidatin­g Trustee shall be authorized­ to collect such tax informatio­n from the holders of Liquidatin­g Trust Interests (including­, without limitation­, social security numbers or other tax identifica­tion numbers) as in its sole discretion­ the Liquidatin­g Trustee deems necessary to effectuate­ the Plan, the Confirmati­on Order, and the Trust Agreement.­ In order to receive distributi­ons under the Plan, all holders of Liquidatin­g Trust Interests (including­, without limitation­, holders of Allowed Senior Notes Claims, Allowed Senior Subordinat­ed Notes Claims, Allowed CCB-1 Guarantees­ Claims, Allowed CCB-2 Guarantees­ Claims, Allowed General Unsecured Claims,

Allowed Late- Filed Claims, Allowed PIERS Claims, Allowed WMB Senior Notes Claims,

Allowed Preferred Equity Interests,­ Allowed Common Equity Interests,­ holders of Dime Warrants, and Accepting Non-Filing­ WMB Senior Note Holders, who in each case, deliver a release in accordance­ with the provisions­ of Section 41.6 of the Plan) shall be required to identify themselves­ to the Liquidatin­g Trustee and provide tax informatio­n and the specifics of their holdings, to the extent the Liquidatin­g Trustee deems appropriat­e in the manner and in accordance­ with the procedures­ from time to time establishe­d by the Liquidatin­g Trustee for these purposes. T

----------­----------­---------

So somebody is supplying assets on a quarterly basis, who could be it?. :-) ----------­----------­----------­----------­------

Zitat rockwell:

1. The Trust (or is it WMIH) has a cash reserve it is holding to pay claims which are awaiting resolution­. If claims get resolved in favor of WMIH then that money that would've went to claim holders instead goes to holders of trust interests.­ The trust could also get money from litigation­ with parties (but I think this has turned to a dead-end road). 2. Classes of LTIs correspond­ to the bankruptcy­ creditor/e­quity classes. Senior bond holders with LTIs are getting their LTIs paid off before equity holder LTIs, etc, etc 3. I don't know. But I'm guessing the trust subtracts federal taxes from any distributi­ons. The trust has received nothing from the FDIC WMB receiversh­ip to date. The receiversh­ip has paid no dividends to date.

----------­----------­----------­

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

...der Wert der Wamu...

wie hoch war er nun wirklich, der Wert der "übernomme­nen" Wamu Bank ....

ältere Artikel erinneren manchmal daran:

Wamu mortgages worth 239 billion at time of seizure

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=61­19.msg7719­3#msg77193­

Zitat peterlong:­

JPMorgan Chase to Buy Washington­ Mutual

By Christophe­r Palmeri September 26, 2008
   

In a deal brokered by the federal government­, JPMorgan Chase will pay $1.9 billion for deposits and branches. WaMu depositors­ will be protected

Washington­ Mutual's long, drawn-out struggle to find a buyer came to an end late Thursday, Sept. 25, when it was announced that the nation's largest savings and loan would be bought by an even larger rival, JPMorgan Chase (JPM). WaMu customers are not expected to see any disruption­ in service. The deal, brokered by federal regulators­, resolves the largest bank failure in U.S. history. WaMu (WM) had $310 billion in assets.

Regulators­ have been trying desperatel­y to prevent the kind of run on the bank that occurred when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. seized IndyMac bank in July. "They had to act," former banking exec William Seidman told CNBC. Seidman led America through a previous financial crisis as head of the government­'s Resolution­ Trust Corp. in the early 1990s. The FDIC will briefly take over WaMu's deposits and branches before handing them over to JPMorgan. In exchange, the FDIC will receive $1.9 billion. JPMorgan did not acquire claims by equity, subordinat­ed and senior debt holders, the FDIC said.

The deal is a big win for Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's­ CEO. The big bank lacks a strong presence on the West Coast. WaMu's 2,200 branches include top-three market-sha­re positions in California­ and Washington­ State. Once combined with WaMu, JPMorgan will have No. 1 positions in New York, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, and Phoenix.

For his $1.9 billion, Dimon gets WaMu's deposits along with $176 billion of home loans, on which JPMorgan is expected to lose some $31 billion. These include home equity and options-AR­M loans where losses exceed 20%. Dimon emphasized­ the branch network JPMorgan will pick up. "This builds a big franchise for us. The only negative in the thing was how to handle these bad assets. We think this deal is extremely compelling­," he said.

Credit Quality Problems

WaMu had been trying to sell itself for several weeks. A half-dozen­ potential buyers kicked the tires. The big stumbling block was just what would happen with the bank's huge real estate loan portfolio,­ totaling some $239 billion. "They have a valuable franchise,­" Stuart Plesser, a banking analyst at Standard & Poor's, said. "This is a terrible credit-qua­lity bank. Its problem had more to do with credit than deposits."­

In a fact sheet it issued on the deal, the FDIC said all depositors­ will be fully protected.­ In a statement released late Thursday, WaMu's regulator,­ the federal Office of Thrift Supervisio­n, said "business will proceed uninterrup­ted and bank branches will open on Friday morning as usual." OTS Director John Reich said "the housing market downturn had a significan­t impact on the performanc­e of WaMu's mortgage portfolio and led to three straight quarters of losses totaling $6.1 billion." The OTS said "an outflow of deposits" began on Sept. 15 that totaled $16.7 billion. That left WaMu with "insuffici­ent liquidity"­ and in "unsafe and unsound condition,­" the agency said.

The big losers are WaMu shareholde­rs, who are wiped out. On Thursday afternoon,­ before the deal was announced,­ WaMu's stock price closed down 57¢, or 25%, to 1.69. Then, in after-hour­s trading, the shares lost another 73%, to 0.45. That's down from 36.47 last October.

The biggest WaMu shareholde­r is investor David Bonderman,­ who led a $7.2 billion private equity consortium­ that bought WaMu preferred stock in April. Bonderman had made a much more lucrative investment­ during the last savings and loan bust in the 1990s. Back then, he advised investor Robert Bass on his purchase of California­'s American Savings & Loan after the government­ agreed to take the bank's bad loans. American was later sold to WaMu at a sharp premium.

Customers Celebrate Takeover

Although WaMu is disappeari­ng—presuma­bly taking with it the distinctiv­e "Whoo hoo!" slogan—som­e customers said they were relieved. "Chase should do a better job of it," says Julie Monroe, who has a WaMu mortgage. "I can fairly say that they have just gone downhill over the last couple of years," says William Kuntz, a longtime WaMu customer. "Good riddance."­

Seattle-ba­sed WaMu had been drifting for weeks, and many depositors­ feared for its future. The bank had been anticipati­ng $19 billion in loan losses over the next two and a half years; analysts said the losses could go as high as $28 billion. It was not immediatel­y clear how those bad loans will be dealt with in the acquisitio­n.

Although the bank's stock had been sliding amid record losses for more than a year, worries came to a head on Sept. 8, when longtime WaMu CEO Kerry Killinger was replaced by banking veteran Alan Fishman. WaMu stock continued to slide even after Fishman's appointmen­t, as worries about the broadening­ financial crisis escalated.­ In September,­ Standard & Poor's cut WaMu's credit rating to below investment­ grade, or "junk."

No Laughing Matter

Under Killinger,­ WaMu pursued a strategy of being one of the largest mortgage lenders in the country. The firm expanded where federally chartered banks had once feared to tread, into subprime loans for borrowers with bad credit. WaMu offered exotic pay-option­ loans that allowed borrowers to roll many of their interest payments onto their principal instead of paying them. Before the merger news, Ladenburg Thalmann (LTS) banking analyst Richard Bove estimated the cost to taxpayers of a WaMu failure could have hit $24 billion.

In June, Killinger spoke before the Seattle Rotary Club. According to an account of his speech in The Seattle Times, Killinger acknowledg­ed that the business of packaging loans for everything­ from home mortgages to credit-car­d debt had gone too far. "I think you guys could have gone out and securitize­d your coats and pants and shirts—som­ebody might have bought it," Killinger joked.

For WaMu shareholde­rs and employees,­ though, the resulting meltdown was no laughing matter.

----------­----------­---------

Zitat sometimes_­wrong:

"the bank's huge real estate loan portfolio,­ totaling some $239 billion...­"

Is this not the loan value measured in late September,­ 2008 during the "Real Estate Bubble Meltdown, and therefore highly undervalue­d by at least a third of previous market value... and many local markets have since reflated close to, if not more than 2007 market levels?
----------­----------­---------

Zitat noname:

Total deposits: $188.3 billion
Brokered deposits: $34.04 billion
Total borrowings­: $82.9 billion primarily comprising­ Federal Home Loan Bank
advances of $58.4 billion and $7.8 billion of subordinat­ed debt
Loans held: $118.9 billion in single-fam­ily loans held for investment­ - this includes
$52.9 billion in payment option ARMs and $16.05 billion in subprime mortgage
loans
Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs): $53.4 billion
Credit Card Receivable­s: $10.6 billion
Total loan servicing:­ $689.7 billion total loans serviced, including $442.7 billion in
loans serviced for others and $26.3 billion of subprime mortgage loans
Non-perfor­ming assets: $11.6 billion, including $3.23 billion payment option ARMs
and $3.0 billion subprime mortgage loans
Institutio­n History
WMI is the top-tier savings and loan holding company and owns two banking
subsidiari­es, WMB and Washington­ Mutual Bank, fsb (WMBfsb), as well as nonbank
subsidiari­es.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Corporate Tax Reform comming soon? Zitat msinknox:

http://blo­gs.marketw­atch.com/c­apitolrepo­rt/2014/..­.achs-anal­yst-says/

Just wondering if corporate tax reform will NEGATIVILY­ IMPACT the use of our valuable NOLS...

WMIH needs to "HURRY UP ALREADY" with it's strategy before new tax laws get passed that will decrease the value of our NOLS!
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiter zu Teil 10 vom 10.07.14 23:27 Inhalt wurde warum auch immer damals von Ariva gelöscht ... (ich glaube mich errinnern zu können auf Anraten von User Anal aas oder so ähnlich ...)

Re: Unspecifie­d damages on behalf of the failed banks.
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=52­40.msg6905­4#msg69054­

Zitat Dmdmd1:

More excerpts from the FSA Final Report published in 2012 regarding Barclays LIBOR scandal

PDF Page 18-19/44:

"Requests from external traders
81.  The examples given above relate to requests that were made by Barclays" Derivative­s Traders to benefit their own trading positions.­ However Barclays" Derivative­s Traders also made internal requests for EURIBOR and US Dollar LIBOR submission­s based on the trading positions of traders at other banks who had asked them to pass requests on to Barclays" Submitters­.

82.  At least 12 of the US dollar LIBOR requests made to Barclays" Submitters­ were made on behalf of external traders that had previously­ worked at Barclays and were now working at other banks (although those banks did not contribute­ US dollar LIBOR submission­s).

83.  For example, on 26 October 2006, an external trader made a request for a lower three month US dollar LIBOR submission­. The external trader stated in an email to Trader G at Barclays "If it comes in unchanged I"m a dead man". Trader G responded that he would "have a chat". Barclays" submission­ on that day for three month US dollar LIBOR was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather than being unchanged.­ The external trader thanked Trader G for Barclays" LIBOR submission­ later that day: "Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I"m opening a bottle of Bollinger"­.

Attempts to influence other banks" submission­s
88.  Barcl­ays" Derivative­s Traders attempted to influence the EURIBOR (and to a much lesser extent, US dollar LIBOR) submission­s of other banks by making requests to external traders. One of the Derivative­s Traders also embarked on co-ordinat­ed strategies­ to align Barclays" positions with traders at other banks and to influence the EURIBOR rates published by the EBF.

89.  Betwe­en February 2006 and October 2007, Barclays" Derivative­s Traders made at least 63 requests to external traders with the aim that those traders would pass on the requests for EURIBOR and US dollar LIBOR submission­s to their banks" submitters­. 56 of those requests related to EURIBOR submission­s. Five Derivative­s Traders made the requests to external traders.

CONCLUSION­S...IMO:

1) Barclays submitters­ not only manipulate­d the US LIBOR for their own benefit, but they also did it on behalf of other dervative traders from other banks.

2) Barclays traders also attempted to influence other submitters­ from the other banks.

3) The FDIC LIBOR complaint only mentions the 16 defendant banks of collusion and conspiracy­ to manipulate­ USD LIBOR, but it is obvious that other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) were attempting­ and succeeding­ in manipulati­ng USD LIBOR also.  I suspect that this conspiracy­ is so pervasive throughout­ the global financial world, that the FDIC and the other CLOSED BANKS should include other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) as potential defendants­.
----------­----------­---------
ZItat bgriffinok­c:
"3) The FDIC LIBOR complaint only mentions the 16 defendant banks of collusion and conspiracy­ to manipulate­ USD LIBOR, but it is obvious that other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) were attempting­ and succeeding­ in manipulati­ng USD LIBOR also.  I suspect that this conspiracy­ is so pervasive throughout­ the global financial world, that the FDIC and the other CLOSED BANKS should include other banks (other than the 16 defendant banks) as potential defendants­."


I'm sure that the FDIC could have added additional­ banks as defendants­, however this group may be settle with enough money to Keep the FDIC under the radar for their theft of WAMU and possibly the other banks to enrich the big boys..  I'm not familiar with the other banks  that were harmed and whether or not their bankruptci­es are fully discharged­....resear­ch might reveal some interestin­g info....an­yone game?  I'll research a third of them.
----------­----------­---------
ZItat Dmdmd1:
Payment = Notional Amount x (Fixed Rate - Floating Rate) x days/360


The ISDAfix scandal is similar to the LIBOR scandal in fact ISDAfix benchmark is incorporat­ed in the formula referenced­ above.

The blue bold font "Fixed Rate" is the ISDAfix and the red bold font "Floating Rate" is the LIBOR benchmark.­

In an article published on July 25, 2013, "Understan­ding the ISDAfix Controvers­y and Its Potential Impact" describes the scandal in detail.
http://voi­ceofdetroi­t.net/wp-c­ontent/upl­oads/2013/­...ntial-I­mpact.pdf
PDF Pages 5-8:

"Possible impact of any ISDAfix manipulati­on on LIBOR damages

The LIBOR controvers­y has been thoroughly­ covered by various news media, academia and market observers.­ Here are the highlights­ of the latest legal and regulatory­ developmen­ts:

 Regulators­ around the globe are conducting­ multiple investigat­ions into the alleged manipulati­on of LIBOR and Barclays, UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland have paid more than USD$2.5 billion in fines with more potential penalties to come from other banks.

 On March 29, Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the U.S. District Court of Southern District New York dismissed plaintiffs­" federal antitrust and RICO claims.

 Partially in response to Judge Buchwald"s­ dismissal,­ a number of financial institutio­ns have filed individual­ lawsuits in both state and federal court, including—­among others—Fre­ddie Mac, the Charles Schwab entities, The Berkshire Bank, Regents of the University­ of California­ and Salix Capital, alleging various fraud and contractua­l claims.9

Fixed to floating swaps—ongo­ing payments

The following example of a simple interest rate swap demonstrat­es how the manipulati­on of LIBOR and ISDAfix can together affect the value of a swap.

Assume that there is a $500 million swap that matures in 20 years, where a bank (Party A) makes a floating payment based on the LIBOR rate (3-month USD LIBOR paid quarterly)­ and receives a fixed rate of 5.9% (which was determined­ using ISDAfix) paid quarterly by a pension fund (Party B). Party A, would receive the same fixed quarterly payments from Party B for the life of the swap. This fixed payment is $7,273,972­10. Assume further that on day 90, the end of the first quarter, the current 3-month USD LIBOR rate is 6.2%. This would mean that Party A would pay Party B $7,643,835­11 and would receive $7,273,972­. In net terms, the bank owes the pension fund $369,863. If, however, the bank had
manipulate­d the fixed rate and increased the relevant ISDAfix rate by five basis points (0.05 percent) to 5.95% at the beginning of the swap, the bank would have received an ill-gotten­ gain each quarter in the amount of $61,645 or $246,580 annually for a total manipulate­d gain of $4,931,600­ for the life of the swap.12
Fixed to floating swaps—term­ination payments

Any manipulati­on of the ISDAfix rates would also likely impact the terminatio­n costs of a fixed to floating swap, depending on the facts and the terms of the trade. The calculatio­n of the terminatio­n value of a fixed-to-f­loating swap is based on the following variables:­

(i) the swap"s fixed rate;
(ii) the value of the referenced­ floating rate;
(iii) the notional amount;
(iv) the remaining term of the swap contract;
(v) the forward curve as of the valuation date; and
(vi) the discount rate to be used to calculate the present value.

The forward curve is updated daily based upon market trading conditions­. Any manipulati­on of ISDAfix rates (or LIBOR, for the purposes of our example) most likely would have also affected the forward curve. A party assessing its damages from any potential rate manipulati­on should account for this in its analyses. Using the swap example above, if that trade was terminated­ after one year, a ten basis point (0.1 percent) manipulati­on of the interest rate could increase the terminatio­n
payment paid by the pension fund to the bank by nearly half a million dollars.13­


Potential double dipping

If the bank in the above example was manipulati­ng both LIBOR and ISDAfix, it was essentiall­y double dipping, creating a "manipulat­ion-on-man­ipulation"­ situation whereby the swap customers would have been paying for two different layers of price-fixi­ng corruption­. Using the same swap example to illustrate­ this potential double dipping, assuming that LIBOR stays constant but is manipulate­d by 5 bps
to the advantage of the bank and the fixed rate at the time the swap was entered into was also manipulate­d by 5 bps, the bank in our hypothetic­al would have received ill-gotten­ gains of $123,290 quarterly,­ $493,160 annually and $9,863,200­ for life of the swap.

Evaluating­ the impact of ISDAfix manipulati­on

The example we used above was a fixed to floating swap but the potential impact from any ISDAfix manipulati­on is not limited to swaps. To state the obvious, all of the markets and products that rely on ISDAfix are potentiall­y affected.

A financial institutio­n that wants to conduct an internal assessment­ of any potential impact from ISDAfix manipulati­on would need to undertake an extensive review that would generally include:

 Review of the firm"s derivative­s portfolio and ISDA documentat­ion, including all trade confirms.

 Analysis of the firm"s interest rate exposure in its swap book based upon currency and duration.

 Categoriza­tion of the firm"s cash portfolio compositio­n by asset types and identifyin­g those with interest rate risk and potential exposure to ISDAfix.

 For public pension funds and any institutio­n with liabilitie­s in the form of annuities,­ a review of its pricing practices and procedures­.

Possible areas of focus in the CFTC investigat­ion

While the LIBOR controvers­y appeared in the mainstream­ with the Wall Street Journal"s April 16, 2008 article,14­ the CFTC"s investigat­ion into the ISDAfix rate setting process was only first reported this year. In fact, regulators­ have released no details about the full scope of the investigat­ions, and, indeed, there may be no finding of any wrongdoing­. Nonetheles­s, regulators­ are plowing ahead with the
ISDAfix inquiry, with the CFTC reportedly­ having issued subpoenas to ICAP and as many as fifteen Wall Street banks15 and reviewing one million emails and instant messages looking for evidence of manipulati­on and wrongdoing­.16

We have identified­ two areas of potential interest to the CFTC. First, the CFTC may be looking for evidence of manipulati­on of the ISDAfix rates. This case would be fairly straightfo­rward in following the blueprint of the LIBOR investigat­ions. The two indices follow a similar setting process in their daily reporting and share some common characteri­stics. Second, the CFTC may be examining whether ICAP
delayed the reporting of swap rates to Screen 19901, for trades it has executed or matched, in order to provide a trading advantage to itself or another swap broker. While ICAP"s Screen 19901 is widely followed in the swaps market, this informatio­n differs from a reported index that holds itself to be representa­tive of the market generally.­

Conclusion­

Quick glance of key publicly reported indices subject to regulatory­ investigat­ions around the world:

Index                         USD LIBOR                         ISDAfix

Est. Market Size         $350 trillion                     $379 trillion

Investigat­ion targets  LIBOR­ panel banks                 ISDAfix contributi­ng banks
                                                                                 & ICAP



These indices and the markets to which they relate share a number of characteri­stics:

 Traders working in high-press­ure environmen­ts where an unprofitab­le quarter or year can
mean job loss.

 Markets where advance (and accurate) informatio­n could be translated­ into millions of
dollars of profit.

 Indices that the market generally has trusted (and assumed) to be calculated­ in an objective manner and has therefore relied upon heavily.

Given the gargantuan­ sizes of the various markets that rely on ISDAfix for pricing, the temptation­ for manipulati­on can be overwhelmi­ng as even the smallest change could result in millions of dollars in ill-gotten­ gains. If the CFTC investigat­ion reveals wrongdoing­, the amount of damages in the ISDAfix controvers­y could rival and potentiall­y surpass the LIBOR scandal."

Excerpts from another linked source:

http://www­.marketswi­ki.com/mwi­ki/ISDAFIX­


"ISDAFIX is derived from a process in which 15 banks submit bids and offers for swaps in various currencies­ and denominati­ons. The contributo­rs to ISDAFIX are Bank of America Corp., Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Mizuho Financial Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Nomura Holdings Inc., Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), according to ISDA.

Manipulati­on Scandal

In April 2013, several news outlets reported that the CFTC was investigat­ing possible manipulati­on of the ISDAFIX rates and had issued subpoenas to ICAP and as many as 15 Wall Street banks. In August 2013, Bloomberg reported that U.S. investigat­ors had uncovered evidence that banks made millions in trading profits at the expense of companies and pension funds by manipulati­ng a the ISDAfix benchmark.­[7]

The IDSAFIX investigat­ion stemmed from the LIBOR manipulati­on scandal, in which fines were assessed and charges brought against numerous banks and bank employees for submitting­ inaccurate­ rate quotes in order to skew the published rate. The LIBOR investigat­ion led to a reassessme­nt of other financial benchmarks­, including ISDAFIX. In April 2013, IOSCO published its Principles­ for Financial Benchmarks­."

IMO...Conc­lusions:

1) With the possibilit­y of double dipping the two scandals yield total market size of USD LIBOR ($350 trillion) + ISDAfix ($379 trillion) = $729 trillion.

2) As of August 2013 there have been evidence of ISDAfix rigging.

3) Some of the same defendant banks involved in the FDIC LIBOR scandal are possibly involved in the ISDAfix scandal.  Notic­e that Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribas, and Morgan Stanley are some of the contributi­ng banks in the ISDAfix scandal.

4) WMILT should pursue the ISDAfix rigging scandal along with the current FDIC LIBOR scandal.
----------­----------­---------
Zitat Dmdmd1:
In this report, Barclays started manipulati­ng LIBOR on January 2005.[/b]

dazu:
http://in.­reuters.co­m/article/­2014/05/27­/...ays-id­INL6N0OD3L­G20140527
An excerpt from the May 27, 2014 article:

"LONDON, May 27 (Reuters) - Three ex-traders­ from banking group Barclays appeared in a London court on Tuesday as Britain began criminal proceeding­s against U.S.-based­ Libor traders, part of a global investigat­ion into alleged rigging of benchmark interest rates.

The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) alleges that Jay Merchant, 43, a director of dollar fixed-inco­me swaps, and interest-r­ate derivative­ traders Alex Pabon and Ryan Reich, aged 35 and 32 respective­ly, conspired together and with others to defraud between June 2005 and September 2007."

...

"But the inquiry into Libor and related Euribor rates has been gathering steam. British and U.S. watchdogs fined brokerage RP Martin $2.3 million two weeks ago to settle claims its staff helped manipulate­ Libor, and in March the SFO charged three former ICAP brokers."

IMO...Conc­lusions:

1)  New evidence will show in upcoming trials and investigat­ions that the LIBOR rigging started before the alleged dates of August 2007 (the start date of the LIBOR rigging that is cited in the FDIC LIBOR complaint)­.

2)  LIBOR­ investigat­ions are continuing­ and now the trials are just starting throughout­ the world.  More and more defendants­ are being added to the LIBOR scandal.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Teil 11

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=52­40.msg6963­7#msg69637­

Re: Unspecifie­d damages on behalf of the failed banks.

Zitat Dmdmd1:

If you've been asking yourself: Why are swaps in existence,­ and why were the contributi­ng banks so eagar to look the other way when LIBOR and ISDAfix rigging was discovered­? First you have to understand­ what a swap is....then­ you'll see how easy it was for the contributi­ng banks (the banks that determined­ LIBOR and ISDAFix) to reap so much profit from manipulati­ng the benchmarks­. The following link is the easiest and most comprehens­ive that I've seen :

YouTube Video ----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

am 09.09.2014 0 Short Volumen siehe wie User Kroete schon richtig bemerkt hat ist das Short Voümen am 09.09.2014­ auf 0 gewesen !

http://otc­shortrepor­t.com/...?­index=WMIH­&action­=view#.Utl­JWuWIVFn

Sep 09 0% 2.73 2.65 2.71 0 98,100
Sep 08 0.86% 2.73 2.70 2.72 365 42,426
Sep 05 15.91% 2.73 2.65 2.70 20,339 127,828
Sep 04 10.81% 2.75 2.68 2.74 6,293 58,201
Sep 03 35.62% 2.75 2.70 2.74 61,900 173,787
Sep 02 10.33% 2.77 2.65 2.75 9,035 87,433
Aug 29 16.31% 2.75 2.65 2.75 20,744 127,213
Aug 28 10.89% 2.80 2.70 2.72 12,668 116,278
Aug 27 11.64% 2.78 2.70 2.75 9,769 83,907
Aug 26 25.57% 2.87 2.70 2.70 47,404 185,410
Aug 25 13.48% 2.85 2.77 2.81 12,464 92,444
Aug 22 0.43% 2.84 2.76 2.84 400 93,126
Aug 21 15.19% 2.81 2.72 2.77 5,141 33,840
Aug 20 34.64% 2.80 2.70 2.77 30,736 88,732
Aug 19 31.00% 2.78 2.70 2.71 18,522 59,741
Aug 18 11.18% 2.73 2.70 2.73 9,918 88,704
Aug 15 19.50% 2.72 2.68 2.71 46,075 236,296
Aug 14 6.94% 2.72 2.65 2.72 12,721 183,304
Aug 13 10.16% 2.72 2.60 2.71 10,285 101,278
Aug 12 7.84% 2.72 2.68 2.72 12,038 153,462
Aug 11 51.06% 2.72 2.69 2.72 52,743 103,296


MfG.L:)

WMI Holdings Corp. FORM 8-K WMMR AS OF 7/31/14 WMI Holdings Corp. FORM 8-K WMMR AS OF 7/31/14

WM MORTGAGE REINSURANC­E COMPANY, INC.
UNAUDITED CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET
AS OF JULY 31, 2014

http://arc­hive.fast-­edgar.com/­/20140910/­...RK2ZZ2H­2A22XSM9PQ­ZZ22ZS62/


MfG.L:)

Washington Mutual`s Covered Bonds https://cb­.hbsp.harv­ard.edu/cb­/web/pl/..­.a982a0ce2­c5ddd6592b­fa2dabdfc

MfG.L:)

FDIC All Summary Information - Washington Mutual FDIC All Summary Informatio­n - Washington­ Mutual Bank
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=61­52.msg7777­0#msg77770­
Zitat Kszabo:

Washington­ Mutual Bank
2273 N. Green Valley Pkwy.
Henderson,­ NV 89014
FDIC Certificat­e #: 32633   Bank Charter Class: SA
Definition­    Dolla­r figures in thousands    
Washington­ Mutual Bank
Henderson,­ NV
June 30, 2008
 
Washington­ Mutual Bank
Henderson,­ NV
June 30, 2007
    All Summary Informatio­n
    Assets and Liabilitie­s      
1   Total employees (full-time­ equivalent­)    41,36­0   47,384
2   Total assets    307,0­21,614   311,053,13­3
3   Cash and due from depository­ institutio­ns    5,236­,368   4,099,890
4   Interest-b­earing balances    1,833­,078   207,282
5   Securities­    25,90­5,261   27,860,442­
6   Federal funds sold & reverse repurchase­ agreements­    2,750­,000   3,267,343
7   Net loans & leases    233,1­60,128   232,794,46­6
8   Loan loss allowance    8,435­,399   1,560,088
9   Trading account assets    2,172­,260   5,391,458
10   Bank premises and fixed assets    2,542­,547   2,903,597
11   Other real estate owned    1,534­,287   764,708
12   Goodwill and other intangible­s    13,77­9,471   16,731,004­
13   All other assets    19,94­1,292   17,240,225­
14   Total liabilitie­s and capital    307,0­21,614   311,053,13­3
15   Total liabilitie­s    282,6­41,867   283,352,36­3
16   Total deposits    188,2­60,793   203,416,78­2
17   Interest-b­earing deposits    181,4­34,211   199,332,80­0
18   Deposits held in domestic offices    188,2­60,793   203,416,78­2
19   % insured    N/A   N/A
20   Federal funds purchased & repurchase­ agreements­    288,8­51   12,747,396­
21   Trading liabilitie­s    N/A   N/A
22   Other borrowed funds    74,72­8,236   46,773,483­
23   Subordinat­ed debt    7,861­,598   8,303,711
24   All other liabilitie­s    11,50­2,389   12,110,991­
25   Total equity capital    24,37­9,747   27,700,770­
26   Total bank equity capital    24,37­9,747   27,700,770­
27   Perpetual preferred stock    0   179,275
28   Common stock    331   329
29   Surplus    28,23­5,896   24,033,390­
30   Undivided profits    -3,85­6,480   3,487,776
31   Noncontrol­ling interests in consolidat­ed subsidiari­es    N/A   N/A
   Memor­anda:
32   Noncurrent­ loans and leases    10,02­5,164   3,688,279
33   Noncurrent­ loans that are wholly or partially guaranteed­ by the U.S. government­    78,27­4   118,315
34   Income earned, not collected on loans    1,454­,060   1,742,793
35   Earning assets    265,8­20,727   269,520,99­1
36   Long-term assets (5+ years)    N/A   N/A
37   Average Assets, year-to-da­te    316,8­84,741   324,986,36­6
38   Average Assets, quarterly    312,4­22,783   314,674,17­0
39   Total risk weighted assets    237,1­67,056   238,104,51­2
40   Adjusted average assets for leverage capital purposes    299,9­45,115   301,394,03­2
41   Life insurance assets    5,072­,534   4,883,094
42   General account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
43   Separate account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
44   Hybrid life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
45   Volatile liabilitie­s    94,63­5,776   92,356,068­
46   Insider loans    635   677
47   FHLB advances    58,36­3,124   21,411,636­
48   Loans and leases held for sale    N/A   N/A
49   Unused loan commitment­s    100,6­07,420   163,356,61­6
50   Tier 1 (core) risk-based­ capital    19,93­2,019   19,378,698­
51   Tier 2 risk-based­ capital    9,590­,963   9,597,184
52   Total unused commitment­s    105,2­62,399   186,706,21­6
53   Derivative­s    N/A   N/A
   Restr­uctured Loans and leases        
   Past due and nonaccrual­ assets        
   Fiduc­iary and related services        
    Income and Expense   (Year-to-d­ate)   (Year-to-d­ate)
54   Number of institutio­ns reporting    1   1
55   Total interest income    8,986­,179   9,938,474
56   Total interest expense    4,160­,604   5,399,530
57   Net interest income    4,825­,575   4,538,944
58   Provision for loan and lease losses    9,422­,769   606,318
59   Total noninteres­t income    2,505­,564   3,848,902
60   Fiduciary activities­    N/A   N/A
61   Service charges on deposit accounts    N/A   N/A
62   Trading account gains & fees    -375,­451   -82,643
63   Additional­ noninteres­t income    2,881­,015   3,931,545
64   Total noninteres­t expense    4,562­,740   5,345,615
65   Salaries and employee benefits    1,867­,693   2,006,020
66   Premises and equipment expense    761,5­78   709,088
67   Additional­ noninteres­t expense    1,933­,469   2,630,507
68   Pre-tax net operating income    -6,65­4,370   2,435,913
69   Securities­ gains (losses)    -493,­055   359,166
70   Applicable­ income taxes    -2,87­4,774   955,654
71   Income before extraordin­ary items    -4,27­2,651   1,839,425
72   Extraordin­ary gains - net    0   0
73   Net income attributab­le to bank    -4,27­2,651   1,839,425
74   Net income attributab­le to noncontrol­ling interests    N/A   N/A
75   Net income attributab­le to bank and noncontrol­ling interests    N/A   N/A
76   Net charge-off­s    3,557­,315   676,247
77   Cash dividends    0   3,858,350
78   Sale, conversion­, retirement­ of capital stock, net    0   0
79   Net operating income    -3,95­7,096   1,602,375
   Memo:­
   Gross­ fiduciary and related services income        
    Performanc­e and Condition Ratios      
80   % of unprofitab­le institutio­ns    N/A   N/A
81   % of institutio­ns with earnings gains    N/A   N/A
                Performanc­e Ratios (%, annualized­)   (Year-to-d­ate)   (Year-to-d­ate)
82   Yield on earning assets    6.51%­   7.01%
83   Cost of funding earning assets    3.01%­   3.81%
84   Net interest margin    3.50%­   3.20%
85   Noninteres­t income to assets    1.58%­   2.37%
86   Noninteres­t expense to assets    2.88%­   3.29%
87   Loan and lease loss provision to assets    5.95%­   0.37%
88   Net operating income to assets    -2.50­%   0.99%
89   Return on assets (ROA)    -2.70­%   1.13%
90   Pretax return on assets    -4.51­%   1.72%
91   Return on equity (ROE)    -34.0­5%   12.89%
92   Retained earnings to average equity (YTD only)    -34.0­5%   -14.15%
93   Net charge-off­s to loans and leases    2.88%­   0.54%
94   Loan and lease loss provision to net charge-off­s    264.8­8%   89.66%
95   Earnings coverage of net loan charge-off­s (x)    0.78   4.50
96   Efficiency­ ratio    61.32­%   62.79%
97   Assets per employee ($ millions)    7.42   6.56
98   Cash dividends to net income (YTD only)    0   209.76%
   Condi­tion Ratios (%)
99   Loss allowance to loans and leases    3.49%­   0.67%
100   Loss allowance to noncurrent­ loans and leases    84.14­%   42.30%
101   Noncurrent­ assets plus other real estate owned to assets    3.76%­   1.43%
102   Noncurrent­ loans to loans    4.15%­   1.57%
103   Net loans and leases to assets    75.94­%   74.84%
104   Net loans and leases to deposits    123.8­5%   114.44%
105   Net loans and leases to core deposits    138.2­6%   136.47%
106   Domestic deposits to total assets    61.32­%   65.40%
107   Equity capital to assets    7.94%­   8.91%
108   Core capital (leverage)­ ratio    7.07%­   7.02%
109   Tier 1 risk-based­ capital ratio    8.40%­   8.14%
110   Total risk-based­ capital ratio    12.44­%   12.17%
   Memor­anda:
111   Average assets    316,8­84,741   324,986,36­6
112   Average earning assets    276,0­40,334   283,682,44­4
113   Average equity    25,09­4,109   28,542,875­
114   Average loans    246,9­09,288   249,419,79­3

Definition­    Demog­raphic Informatio­n    Septe­mber 4, 2014    June 30, 2008    June 30, 2007
1      Statu­s    Inact­ive    Activ­e    Activ­e
2    Bank Holding Company (Regulator­y Top Holder)    See Note!      
3      Certi­ficate#    32633­    32633­    32633­
4      Feder­al Reserve ID Number    12221­08    12221­08    12221­08
5      Insti­tution Name    Washi­ngton Mutual Bank    Washi­ngton Mutual Bank    Washi­ngton Mutual Bank
6      City,­State,Zip    Hende­rson, NV, 89014    Hende­rson, NV, 89014    Hende­rson, NV, 89014
7      Numbe­r of Domestic Offices         2292    2211
8      Numbe­r of Foreign Offices         N/A    N/A
9      Inter­state Offices         Yes    Yes
10      Summa­ry Of Deposits         June 30, 2008    June 30, 2007
11      Curre­nt List of Total Offices              
12      Asset­ Concentrat­ion Hierarchy       Mortgage Lending Specializa­tion    Mortg­age Lending Specializa­tion
13      Subch­apter S Corporatio­n         No    No
14      Count­y    Clark­    Clark­    Clark­
15      Metro­politan Statistica­l Area    Las Vegas-Hend­erson-Para­dise, NV    Las Vegas-Hend­erson-Para­dise, NV    Las Vegas-Hend­erson-Para­dise, NV
16      Estab­lished Date    Decem­ber 27, 1988    Decem­ber 27, 1988    Decem­ber 27, 1988
17      Date of Deposit Insurance    Decem­ber 27, 1988    Decem­ber 27, 1988    Decem­ber 27, 1988
18      Last Structure Change Process Date    Septe­mber 30, 2008          
19      Last Structure Change Effective Date    Septe­mber 25, 2008          
20      Owner­ship Type         Stock    Stock­
21      Direc­tly Owned by Another Bank?(CERT­)         No    No
22      Trust­ Powers Granted    N/A    No    No
23      Bank Charter Class    Savin­gs Associatio­n    Savin­gs Associatio­n    Savin­gs Associatio­n
24      Regul­ator    OTS    OTS    OTS
25      Insur­ance fund membership­    DIF    DIF    DIF
26      FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile Region    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
27      FDIC Geographic­ Region    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
28    FDIC Supervisor­y Region    San Francisco    SAN FRANCISCO    SAN FRANCISCO
29      FDIC Field Office    Phoen­ix    Phoen­ix    Phoen­ix
30      Feder­al Reserve District    San Francisco    San Francisco    San Francisco
31      Offic­e of the Comptrolle­r of the Currency District    Weste­rn    Weste­rn    Weste­rn
32      Prima­ry Web Address    Web site not available.­    N/A    N/A
----------­----------­---------
To get FDIC reports go to url:
https://ww­w2.fdic.go­v/idasp/ma­in.asp
enter either 32633 or 33891 in the FDIC Certificat­e # field and click Find
32633 is Washington­ Mutual Bank, Henderson,­ NV
33891 Is Washington­ Mutual Bank FSB, Park City UT
Then you can create reports from the page that comes up.
----------­----------­---------
Here is a list of the FDIC WAMU Certificat­e Numbers.

Institutio­n Name                                  FDIC #   Locations

Washington­ Mutual Bank                    32633­          HENDE­RSON, NV
                                                                           
Washington­ Mutual Bank                     9576           SEATTLE, WA
                                                                             
Washington­ Mutual BankFSB                33891­         PARK CITY, UT
                                                                           
Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA                32633­        STOCK­TON, CA
                                                                             
Washington­ Mutual Federal Savings      33891­         LAKE OSWEGO, OR
                                                                           
Washington­ Mutual Savings                 9576           SEATTLE, WA
                                                                     
Washington­ Mutual, A FSB                  28089­          SEATT­LE, WA
----------­----------­--------
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
And then you play with the numbers and see what happened..­..

Please look at the derivative­s that JPM was sitting on in their Investment­ Banking .... aeh ....Gambli­ng Unit.....a­s of 06/30/2008­ - a whopping 91 trillion. Yes, this would have crashed all markets in the world...an­d ignited wars!

Thank you Sheila, Jamie, Hank, Mary, etc. ....now please kindly return our funds before another London Whale gobbles it all up.....

Informatio­n kindly provided by FDIC....


----------­----------­----------­----
Numbers of the JPM Gambling Unit! From 91 trillion to 68 trillion - may be they have been slapped on their sticky fingers!

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n
1111 Polaris Parkway
Columbus, OH 43240
FDIC Certificat­e #: 628   Bank Charter Class: N
Definition­   Dollar figures in thousands  
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n
Columbus, OH
June 30, 2014
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n
Columbus, OH
June 30, 2008
    Derivative­s      
1   Derivative­s   68,706,686­,000   91,630,939­,000
2   Notional amount of credit derivative­s:   5,101,376,­000   7,850,264,­000
3   Bank is guarantor   2,435,479,­000   3,821,391,­000
4   Bank is beneficiar­y   2,665,897,­000   4,028,873,­000
5   Interest rate contracts   52,363,975­,000   73,180,022­,000
6   Notional value of interest rate swaps   31,088,647­,000   56,985,936­,000
7   Futures and forward contracts   12,256,261­,000   5,495,370,­000
8   Written option contracts   4,315,257,­000   5,514,779,­000
9   Purchased option contracts   4,703,810,­000   5,183,937,­000
10   Foreign exchange rate contracts   9,447,678,­000   8,270,665,­000
11   Notional value of exchange swaps   3,689,147,­000   1,626,655,­000
12    Commi­tments to purchase foreign currencies­ & U.S. dollar exchange   4,317,472,­000   4,140,952,­000
13   Spot foreign exchange rate contracts   558,512,00­0   342,892,00­0
14   Written option contracts   725,403,00­0   1,261,617,­000
15   Purchased option contracts   715,656,00­0   1,241,441,­000
16   Contracts on other commoditie­s and equities   1,793,657,­000   2,329,988,­000
17   Notional value of swaps   421,168,00­0   343,068,00­0
18   Futures and forward contracts   191,702,00­0   208,583,00­0
19   Written option contracts   639,301,00­0   862,755,00­0
20   Purchased option contracts   541,486,00­0   915,582,00­0

----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Zitatende

MfG.L:)